

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF
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first concrete sign of the new spirit was the conclusion of an alliance with Japan in January, 1902, the object of which was to oppose Russian domination in the Far East, which threatened our valuable Chinese market.

Far more important was the rapprochement with France, which began to be academically discussed in 1902 between Lansdowne and Paul Cambon, die French Ambassador.

For several years each country had grounds of complaint.

Englishmen were deeply shocked at the persecution of the innocent Dreyfus. Frenchmen thought with anger of the forced surrender at Fashoda, and their sympathies with the Boers were unconcealed. Nations, however, like individuals, sometimes

change their moods with astonishing rapidity. Moreover, Delcasse, who had been Foreign Minister since 1898, realized

that France could not afford more than one enemy. It had been his painful duty to climb down in the valley of the Nile,

but he knew that more could be gained from co-operation with England than from sulking or dreams of revenge.

With the aid of Barrere, his resourceful Ambassador in Rome, he had liquidated Italian hostility by two secret pacts. In 1900 the

countries recognized each other's claims in Tripoli and

Morocco, while in 1902 Italy promised neutrality in a Franco-German war.

She remained a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance, but henceforth she had one foot in each camp, and

in the following years she moved ever closer to Paris and St.

Petersburg.

When he had finished with Italy Delcasse turned to London.

With the end of the Boer War warmer airs began to blow.

The successful visit of King Edward in April, 1903, was re-

turned by President Loubet, who was accompanied by the

Foreign Minister. On July 7 Delcasse and Lansdowne

inaugurated the negotiations which led to the Anglo-French treaty of April 8, 1904. The governing factor was the eagerness of France to secure preponderance in Morocco. Italy's assent had been cheaply purchased at the expense of Tripoli. England's price was higher, for our strategic and commercial interests in Morocco were great, and the golden opportunity of securing a free hand in Egypt was seized. Lansdowne's maxim was firmness in Egypt and pliability elsewhere. The final settlement, which was facilitated by the wide scope of the negotiations, was satisfactory to both sides. We declared that we had no intention of altering the juridical status quo in Egypt, and France undertook not to obstruct our action by